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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~!LYURD

10NSEN,

N. HANSEN and VADA J.
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

\15.

JOHN J. STEWART and ALICE E.K.
STEWART, husband and wife,

Supreme Court No.

19383

Defendants/Respondents

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was originally brought to determine the location
of a boundary line between property owned by Plaintiffs and
property owned by Defendants.

Since the location of that

bounJary line hinged on the location of the northeast corner of
the Lot

12,

Block 34 of the Providence Farm Survey,

attempt to limit and simplify the issues at trial,

and in an
all parties

nutually stipulated to waive all other claims and to proceed to
trial on the sole issue of the location of the lot corner, which
would

in turn establish the south boundary line of Defendants'

property and the north boundary line of Plaintiffs' property.
The Parties further stipulated that the prevailing party was
entitled to judgement for monetary damages in the amount of

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents agree in principal with Appellants' statement
rPq~rding

the disposition of the case in the lower court.

STATEMENT Of FACTS
Defendcints purchased the property which is thL· suh i'''
of

the

above-entitled

purchased

land

action

in

(TV.11. p.74,1.111)

1967.

adjoining Defendants' property on

southern and eastern boundaries

in

m,1

1969.

r:>r

P 1ilint1 ·,

DefPnd~nts'

(TV.I,

At the time Plaintiffs purchased the property,

t t

p.13,

1.12-22)

they were awcire of

a possible boundary dispute or at least the existence of some
problems

with

the boundary

location.

(TV.I,

p.14,

Shortly after purchasing their property,

1.3-13)

1.18-21,

p.35,

Plaintiffs began

making claims that the fence on Defendants' southern boundary was
not the actual boundary line,

claiming that the boundary line was

actually north of the existing fence extending into property
owned by Defendants.
Plaintiffs eventually filed

this law suit.

Defendants hired a registered land surveyor,
Century Sur"eyors,
boundary.

Thereafter,

Randy Bott,

of

to survey the property to determine the actual

As a result of that survey (often referred to as

"Bott Survey"),

the

it was discovered that the original northeast

corner of Lot 12, Block 34,

Providence Farm Survey,

beginning point of reference

for

which was the

Plaintiffs' legal description,

was not where Plaintiffs had claimed it to be.

The original

northeast corner of Lot 12 was 33 feet south of where Plaintiffs
claim

the

northeast

corner

to be.

(TV.IL

p.125,

1.3-15)

Defendants thereby discovered that their property not only went
to the fence on the southern boundary, but ext0ndf'd a
beyond

(south)

the existing

fence.

2

few

feet

for

c~xcept

1 '-'

-1·.

~·'

4,

the

loc<ition of

Farm Survey,

~rovidence

1~tPd

to by the parties at

,, if''J1.·it1on of the: parties,
1 '"

:1ury wcis the

the northeast corner of Lot 12,
all other matters were

trial.

Pursuant to the

the only matter

for determination by

location of the northeast corner,

which would in

· urr1 ;'1etPrminc: the actual boundary line between the properties
- ·.-.·ried tJy Defendants and Plaintiffs.
:'he :;ury,

after hearing the facts,

evidence and testimony,

to1c11ch primarily consisted of testimony from four expert
~1tnesses;

Ken Spires and Clyde Naylor testifying on behalf of

tJ;dnt1ffs,

cind Rcindy Bott and Louis Hickman testifying on behalf

,f Defendants) determined that the northeast corner of Lot 12
~as

located where Defendants claimed it to be.
!Jistrict Court

,cJry,

'·lot inrt

Record,

p.

52)

(Verdict of the

Plaintiffs then filed a

for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New

Trial.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' Motion and ordered

Judgement be entered according to the verdict of the jury.

n~·

i\l··i:,or'"n'1um Decision,
l·1st r

l

ct

Court Record,

District Court Record,
p.

100;

pp.

92,

93;

Order,

See also Defendants' Memorandum in

'l'"''s1t1on to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding
ti«?

\'E"rdict)

•),1rt nf

Plaintiffs then appealed this matter to the Supreme

the State of Utah.
ARGUMENTS
I.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO A JURY TRIAL.
A quick review nf

the

Jaw on a party's right to a

jury trial

in a quiet t i t l e action indicr-it-0s thnt m,1ny

trial by jury for such actions.
decided that
demand a
(Utah

il

party to a quiet

jury trial.

1958)

However,

sl,1t1'S (lr1

Utrlh

has

lon'J

title action hcis a

In Holland v.

Wilson,

r:,it

,-1]

since

risht

to

r.2d 2S1-,,

327

lo'...;

252

this court stated:

We are further of the opinion that although historically
an action to quiet title was originally equitable and
the law courts had no jurisdiction to grant such
relief, that situation does not prevail in this case.
Formerly the equity courts afforded relief because
there was no adequate remedy at law.
In this
jurisdiction, however, there is an adequate remedy
provided by statute under the provisions of chapter 40
of title 78 U.C.A. 1953.
Likewise in tl11s state the
distinctions between law and equity actions have heen
abolished by Article VIII. Sec. 19, of the Constitution of
Utah.
We are further of the opinion that the right to a Jury
trial in this type of case is assured by Section 78-21-1,
U.C.A. 1953 which declares:
Right to jury trial. - In actions for the
recovery of specific real or persoral property,
with or without damages . . . . an issue of
fact may be tried by jury, unless a jury trial
is waived .
The Holland case was an action by the plaintiff to quiet
title to certain unpatented mining claims.
trial court had designated as an

issue of

In
fact

its pretrial,

the question of

whether the defendants had done assessment work
ending July 1,

1954 on the claims invol•;eu

trial court had refused the plaintiff's
trial,

the

for

in the

request

the year

law suit.

for a

The

Jury

and on appeal the only quest ion to he dee tdPd by the

Utah Supreme Court was whether or not

Plaintiffs Ind cin ahS1)ltJte

r i g h t t o h a v e th e i s s u e s o f f a c t d e t e r m i n e d h y a

:i r y "

lh'

n

,1

proper demand was made therefor.
the opinion that

there can no longer be any guestton as

4

to tl115

,-1

:i2-; r./,l ,·,t

i qh t."

l

~51.

The Supreme Court

further

said:

I t 1s our opinion that the above language [refering to
Section 78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953], if given reasonable and
rational construction, must be interpreted as
declarin9 that all issues of fact relating to possession
of specific real and personal property may be determined
by a jury unless a jury trial is waived.
327 P-2d at 252.

The

instant

case,

as designated in Appelants' brief,

action to quiet title to real property.
the

jury for

the

12,

Block 34,

The only issue put to

jury's determination was purely a

that being the factual

is an

factual

issue,

location of the northeast corner of Lot

Providence Farm Survey.

At trial,

Plaintiffs

contended that the original northeast corner had moved and
changed from where it had been placed and that by usage and
history the original northeast corner became the corner of the
Larsen

Defendants contended that the original northeast

fence.

corner did not move; that it was located where the plats,
surveys,

deeds and other

records indicated it would be,

i.e.

1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of Lot 12,
34.

All of the evidence presented to the

the location of
plats,

deeds,

usage,

etc.,

fences,

monuments,

jury,

which included

possession lines,

surveys,

techniques used in surveying, historical and common
was presented in an attempt to convince the jury of

the true location of that northeast corner,
factual

Block

issue properly put to the

jury for

which was purely a
its determination.

II.

THC JURY'S VERDICT MUST STAND UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN
THAT TllCRC WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE t:VlUENCE TO
JUSTIFY THE VERDICE AS GIVCN.
lJtcJh case
t

law

is rich with authority detililing the scope of

C'Jiew irn·l tl1e Supreme Court's right

to overturn the

jury's

verctict.
evidencA

Those
~-.rh1ch

c

-1.

is

s es

pr

1

n 1~ l p

required

-1

to

1 1y

d t •. 1 l

sup[Jnrt

~ . .; l

t ]1

the

whose favor the evictence must be viewed.

t h'

J[!,11

Jllt'/'s

The

11,1

>I

\lf_'11J1,·t

f() I l uw

1 ri<_r

1r1,J

(

.1 st~s

are a synopsis of rulings on this issue from the Ut>1h Suprc_-mc•
Court:
Ute - CAl Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utcih,
605 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980):
In viewing this evidence,
this Court will upset the jury verctict only upon a
showing by the appealing party that the evidence so
clearly preponderates in his favor reasonable people
could not differ on the outcome of the case.
Also in
determining if there was sufficient evidence to support
the Jury's verdict this Court will consider those facts
which most strongly support the verdict and where there
is anv conflict in the evidence this Court will
consider as true that evidence which supports the
verdict.
Gilhespie v. DeJong, Utah, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (1974):
This case falls within these pronouncements we have
often made: that the parties appear to have had what
they are entitled to: a full and fair opportunity to
presen~ their contentions,
and the evidence supporting
the:n, t:c the court and jury, and to have a verdict ancl
judgment entered thereon.
When this has been done, all
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the
verdict and Judgment; and this court will not distrurb
them unless there is substantial and prejudicial error,
absent which there is a reasonable likelihood that
there would have been a different result.
Gessner v. Dairymen Associates, Inc., Utah, Gll P.2d
713, 715 (1980):
This Court assumes the jury believed
those aspects of the evidence which sustain the
findings and the judgment, and therefore makes its
analysis of the case and draws its conclusions on the
basis of the facts so found.
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C.
Foy & Sons, Inc., Utah, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1983):
It
is the prerogative of the jury to resolve issues of
fact, and the accepted rules of appellate review
preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for
that of the jury on issues of fact.
On appeal, we view
the evidence in the light most supportive of the
verdict, and assume that the Jury believed those
aspects of the evidence which sust~in its findings and
judgment.
We will upset a Jury verdict only upon .1
(,

in

shr)v.·in'l
f o'J'·t
-~f

r11ffer

th;;jt_

,:-Jr!

th!;:-'

so clearly preponderates

0v1,ll'rJC•~

in

lh• "l'f'''' 1 iHct ·.nill reasonable people would not
thi.:· c,utc,:)r~1"::' of the case.

G,r 1:1 '-'~ T r ' - u - J n c . , U t a h , t 6 7 P 2 d 5 9 8 , 6 O l ( l 9 8 3 ) :
I t 1 s l he ex c J us : '.' e
r u v 1 n c e of the jury to determine
the credibility c 1 ~ ttie v.1 1tn>-.;sses, weigh the evidence,

u

,nd

mc,f:•_· f1n•iJr1ns of fac·t.
l-.'1 l liams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah
.c; ~ 7 , ~ ~ '' - j (', .; 1 ~ I . ~ d le L , l G ~ i I CJ 6 5 } ; Joseph v.
W.ll. CrCl'Jes Lcettel-Lioy S,c,1n~s Hosp1tcd, 10 Utah 2d 94,
9'?-10(1, ..'.'-tL !'.~Ci ci,:;~, 93f) (J=lGCJ).
Vihere the evidence
:s conf] ic<-1r1~ ancJ lht...· Ju1·y 1s properly instructed, we
io not upset ttrose findings of fact on appeal except
_;} 1 on
::i sh c• v..· i n ~_; th "i t
t rt t_· ~ \' :;_ , le r 1 c e 1 --.,· i e w e d 1 n the 1 i g ht
@ost favorable to the verdict, so clearly preponderated
in appel ldnt's fd\'Dr tt1CJt reasonable persons could not
.11ffer on the outcome :if tCJe case.
Ute-Cal Land
[•e\·elopment Corp. v. ~>rthe':", !_'tan, GC•S P.2d 1240, 1245
(l"CC•); Nelson v. Watts, Utcd1, SC:O P.2d 798, 799
( 1 q '77) .

=d

1::,'ich

of

the

Supreme Court

above-ci tPL! cases holds,

must

cari

]--1::-y

G,ost

:~·1er':"'

is ;io

J:....:r1·'s

·~tror,

::he

Respondcn:t,

only be D\·er-turned if,

l 1~h1=-

•_11...:.

lhe ev:dence in a

view

:he :-ionr:io'.·1:-ig p::i.rty,

fa':::JrablL· -.::.o thf-'
subs:.ari::.10~

vc::r.Jic,_

i,...;1thout

o~

v.1 hich

in essence,

~-here

\'le1A1

R':>spDndarit,

basis

that

Jn

and

light
that

the

favorable to

verdict of

the

the

ing the evidence in a
the

finds

court

in

:.:.he

evidence

t:-1erc·

w·2.1s

subst:::intial

is a

most

that

which

that

would support

and prejudicial

r<?dSOt:C:ible 11klihood that

there

l l I.
'l'Hl::RE

IS CO~JSIDl::R.".i3LE .4'.:D SL:BST,',~JTIAL EVIDENCE TO

SUPPORT THE JURY'S
In his

Memorandum

~CR~JCT

Decision denying Appellant's Motion for

ld,]13vmcnt Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New
llc•11urahl•' Omc'r J.

. . . suffice>

Cal 1,

it

trial

JUdge

to s'y thilt
7

in the

Trial,

instant action,

in the court's opinion

the

there

was

substantial

cv1JenL·,_.

compct(~nt

to

susL.1111

th~·,

jury's verdict and therefore the Plaintiffs' Motl<)[1 for
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict Or In TltP
Alternative For ,\ Retrial should br> rl<>nied.
The 1·nurt
regurds the jury's decision ilS affecting thP North
South boundary line between these parties, and thn othPr
results stipulated to by the parties.
(Memorandun Decision,
District Court Record, p. 93)
The evidence referred to by the trial court consists
primarily of Mr.
Plat

(Exhibit

Bott's survey (Exhibit 8),

1),

the

1896 plat (Exhibit

Providence township (Exhibit
(Exhibit

2),

included

the Albern E.

numerous deecls,

registered land surveyor,
licensed engineer,

35)

the

30)

Martineau

the map of

the

the Cache County Plat

Allen Abstr'lct

(Exhibit

testimony from Randy L.

37)

which

Bott,

Cl

and testimony from Louis Hickmi'ln,

a

land surveyor and certifred abstractor.

In order to appeal the admissibility of evidence presented
at trial,

Appellants i'lre required to make a

the time of trial.

timely objection i'lt

Appellants i'lccepted both clr.

Hickman as expert witnesses (TV.II, p.106,
1.19) and did not object

the

In

Lict,

it 1-Jas Plaintiffs who

Martineau Plat and the Bott Survey into evidence.

Plaintiffs cannot now attack
as unlawful,

1.18: TV.III, p.S,

to the evidence presented by Defendants

and received by the trial court.
introduced

Bott and Mr.

unfounded,

the evidence presentecl by Defendants

or invalid or attempt

evidence is better than other evidence.

It

is

to

SilY

what

the sole pcovince

of the jury to determine the credibility of the 1-ntnessces and
exhibits and to weigh in their own minds the value of th!'>
testimony presented by both sides.

E.

A.

St

r,JUt

West~rn

R0<1 l

~

.....
Cintron
the

''·

Utah,

Milkovich,

611 P.2d 730,

732 (1980).

jury has weighed the evidence and entered its verdict,

Once

the

,,u!e issue on appeal is to determine if there is any reasonable
hasis

in the evidence to support the

jury's verdict or if there

.ere subtantial and prejudicial errors,

reasonable likaihood the
J1 f ferent.

In the

without which there is a

jury's verdict would have been

instant case there is ample evidence to

support the decision and there were no substantial and
)'H'JUd1cial errors committed at
cummi':ted at trial,

it

trial.

Even if there were errors

is unlikely the Jury's verdict would have

been any different.
Mr.

Bott testified that the record distance, according to the

Martineau survey and other plats and deeds,

,,f

Lot.

12 (which is a known line agreed to by all parties) to

Lhe center
i·-119,
~,

line of

J.25)

and

7th South Street

that he

2,065.23

feet

Mr. Sp i er s ( expert w i t n es s

line of Lot 12 to the center line of 7th South was 2,067 feet

(T\'.I,

p.78,

1.20-23;

which is 1.77 feet

TV.I,

farther

in the ancient plats.

p.82,

1.8-12; TV.I,

p.84,

hJl•,ed by all parties

··rner of
"' l•pncJl

lot

12 was

1.5-11)

than the record measurement called
Mr.

Bott also testified that the

record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12,

road

(TV.II,

the Plaintiff) testified that the measured distance from the

souLh

fJr

was

measured the distance on the ground as

C> C 5 • 5 S feet. (TV. I I , p. 1 2 0, 1. 1 )

fur

from the south line

which is

to be a known location, to the northeast
1320 feet

(TV.II,

pl22,

1.20-25);

that

the

and subsequent plats and surveys called for a 66 foot

(4 rods) and that

the distance from the southeast corner of

')

Block 8 to 700 South Slreel wc1s

(,GO

feel.

(TV.JI,

f>.1)2,

1.14)

Several witnesses testified thilt the measured d1sL1ncc, from tl1•c
southeast corner of Lot 12 to the present soulh

line of 800 South

(or what has been referred to in the trial as the Lilrsen fence and
claimed by Plaintiffs as the northeast corner of

lot 12) is

approximately 1350.5 to 1354.5 feet (TV.I, p. 82, 1.12; TV.II, p.
63, 1.20; TV.II, p.121, 1.6), and that the distance from the
Larsen fence,

on the present south side of 800 south to the fence

on the north side of 800 South was 33 feet.

Mr.

Bott testified

that the record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to
the south line of lot 8,
800 south street,
(TV.I, p.49,

which is the north side of the present

is 1320 feet plus 66 feet or 1386 feet.

1.16-18; TV.II, p. 39,

11) The measured

1.12-22; TV.II p.

125,

1.10-

distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to

the south line of lot 8, or the north side of 800 South was
measured by Mr. Bott to be 1386 feet,
123,

(TV.II, p.122, 1.20-25, p.

1.1-6) which completely agrees with the record distances

established in the ancient plat surveys; was measured by Mr.
Spires to be 1387.5 feet (TV.I, p.82, p.84,
of 1.5 feet; and was measured by Mr.

1.11) for a diference

Naylor to be 1386.S feet,

(TV.II, p.63, 1.20, p. 39, 1.21-22) for a difference of .S feet.
Mr. Bott concluded therefrom, and so testified,

that lot 12

had been laid out on the ground as a lot 1320 feet north and
south by 660 feet east and west, that a 66 foot

road had been

laid out between lot 12 and lot 8, and that the south line of lot
8 was laid out to be 1386 feet from the south line of
(TV.II,

p.142,

1.6-21)

This was confirmed by

10

the

lot 12.

record

m~asurements

and by actual measurements on the ground.

Mr. Bott

,3lso concluded that the northeast corner of lot 12 was 1320 feet
directly north of

the southeast corner of

lot 12,

33 feet south of

(RV.II,

vihere Mr.

p.125,

1.3-15)

ironically only about

Spires

,rnd Mr.

Naylor had placed the northeast corner of lot 12 and they

both allowed for only a 33 foot road instead of 66 feet as called
for

in

the ancient plats.

Mr. Hickman testified that
the ancient plats and the

measured distances in the Bott survey

'Ullaborated one another.
and Mr.

the record distances indicated on

(TV.III,

Bott each testified that

lS,

p.

1.19-23)

Mr.

Hickman

the standard historical distance

of lots when originally platted and laid out on the ground was
80 rods by 40 rods (1320 feet by 660 feet), or a quarter of a
milP by one eighth of a
olso the
TV.III,

standard

p.9,

mile,

viidth

1.3-24)

for

and that a 4 rod
platted

(66 foot) road was

roads.(TV.II,

p.141.

1.12-25;

This standard distance of 1320 feet

from

the

southeast corner of lot 12 to the northeast corner of Lot 12 was
also substantiated by the 1896 plat,

(Exhibit 30),

the

Providence tovin map (Exhibit 35) and the official Cache County
Plat

(Exhibit

2).

This distance is also well established in the

original deeds transfering the property.
the Albern Allen abstract
transfer from Milton D.

(Exhibit 37), beginning with the

Hammond to Mattie Hansen (number 6 in

s,1id Abstract) dated January 12,
if

the north part of Lot

The deeds referenced in

12,

1877,

block 34,

transfered the "west part
Plat A,

Providence Farm

Survey," and stated that the dimensions of the parcel were 40
rods by 20 rods

(1660 feet

by 330 feet)

11

and contained 5 acres.

Mr.

Hickman testified thcit the with those st.-,t,,d cl1mcnsions

for

the west part of the north part of Lot 12, the dimensions of the
entire Lot

12 would be

1320 feet

by 660 fecet,

(TV.III,

p.18,

1.14-18) which were the platted dimensions on all of aforereferenced plats.

That parcel continued to be a

5 acre parcel,

40 rods by 20 rods, until Albern Allen deeded a 40 foot strip at
the bottom (south) of said parcel to Charles Miller,
predecessor in title.
parcel,

Appellants'

Mr. Allen then deeded the remainder of

which was then 620 feet by 330 feet

(20 rods)

the

to

Respondant herein in 1967 who has held title to the property ever
since.

(Exhibit 9)

As stated earlier,

although Plaintiffs/Appellants

first

introduced the Martineau Plat into evidence as Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1 and originally relied on said Plat as the basis

for

their current surveys,(TV.I, p.65, 1.14-17, p.67, 1.3-9)
Appellants now attempt to disparage and discredit the Martineau
plat as being an unauthenticated "office survey."
in 12 Am Jur 2d,

Boundaries, Section 113,

It

is stated

that an ancient survey

made by a competent authority and recorded or accepted as a
public document,

produced from proper custody,

is admissible in

evidence without further verification to prove the location of
the boundary line.
Boundaries,

It is further stated in 12 Am Jur 2d,

Section 115, that an original map,

found in proper custody,

over 30 years olcl,

authorized and recognized as

document, and free on its face of suspicion,

~n

off1c1~l

is admissible 1n

evidence as an "ancient document" to prove the location of th<c
boundary 1 i ne.

Certainly the Martineau Plat dated 1880 and the

12

(Exh1lllt

JIJ)

constitute ancient surveys and/or ancient

: wuments which have been referred to by the witnessess and
,,

0

)1ecl on by the witnesses and have been recognized as official

!oruments by the Cache County Recorder.
The ancient documents,

and other maps,

r 0 11ed on by the Respondents,

plats,

and deeds

and the testimony of Respondents

~1tnessess

constitute substantial creditable evidence more than

suff i=ient

to

justify the

jury's verdict

in favor of Respondents.

Plct1ntiff's objections to the ancient plats,
at

cill,

go to the weight of such evidence,

if given any merit

not to the

admissibility of said plats.
IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT AFFECTS ONLY THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO
ESTABLISH THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THEM AND DOES NOT
IMPACT SURROUNDING PROPERTY OWNERS
Throughout the trial and this appeal Appellants have raised
:•ie emotional and rather imaterial claim that all property owners
1n

the area will be affected by the jury's verdict,

even

sugoesting that boundary lines would have to shifted.
contrary,
:1P

To the

it is well recognized that the only parties affected by

decision of the

jury are the parties involved in the

11tigation and the only impact of the jury's decision is to
letPrmine the location of the lot corner which in turn by
stipulation determines the boundary line disputed by the parties.
In Fisl1er v. Davis,
'•J

77 Utah 81, 2'll P. 493 (1930), an action

quiet tJt!e to mininr1 cJ,>ims in 1'/asatch County,

the Supreme

'',JurL ,,f Ut"h stated thdt the decree quieting title to the claims

would only bind thP parties to the action.
case had maintained that the Court's decision was

in errnr

because it had been shown at trial that other partiPs may claim
an interest in the mining claims.

This Court held that

those

other parties could still maintain an action regarding the mining
claims and that the decision to quiet title only affected the
parties involved.
In the instant case,

the verdict of the

jury only decides

and resolves the boundary dispute between the parties in this
action and does not locate the northeast corner of lot 12 for any
other person nor does the jury's decision adversely affect anyone
Appellants' assertion otherwise would require the District

else.

Court in future actions to ignore the longstanding legal
doctrines regarding res

judicata and collateral estoppel.

v.
APPELLANTS CANNOT ASSIGN ERROR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL
TO GIVE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS WHEN NO OBJECTION WAS ENTERED
NOR ANY EXCEPTION TAKEN.
Appellants have continually attempted to assign error to the
trial court's failure to give certain
by Appellant at trial.
stated

in State v.

jury instructions

requested

The Utah Supreme Court has recently

Evans,

668 P.2d

566,

568 (Utah

1983):

"Generally for a party to be in a position to complain of the
trial courts failure to give an instruction, he must

first propnse

the instruction and then take excPption to the courts refusal
give it."
1978)

The Court cited Stcite v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utuh

wherein this Court had stated:
Generally,

for a party to take advantage of the
14

tri~l

to

c-•_1urt 's fa1 lure t<J give full and correct instructions,
m11st fl rst propose correct instructions, and should
the ·Dur• f;,i 1 tD give them, to then except thereto.
-, r - r' . ::: \J a t I J •

11~·

is furt11er

it

:_,,)

ar1

~~J''"-'

stated in Rule 51,

Utah Rules of Civil

"n0 part; rc1ay assign the error of giving or failure

'(lur•_·:

instruction

Appellants failed

unless he objects thereto."

to enter objections to the trial court's

ref us" I to gi vrc requested

jury instructions in the record and

!a1led to take exception to Jury instructions given or not given.
~PP~~

lar1ts

now atten1pt

to create a record which never existed by

listing in their brief Jury instructions which may or may not
r1ave loeen reques'.:cod of

•.-;ere modified by the trial court.

lr:S~ructions

Jo nol

the court and by suggesting in their brief
Respondants

wish to impune the character or integrity of Appellants or

the1r counsel,

but submit that Appellants cannot be allowed to

=reale for this appeal a record not in existence when there is no
nossiblity of acurately establishing what actually transpired at
t!1e

court

~rial

level.

Appellants must be bound by the record

,,nd t:-c;nscript prepdred by tt1e duly certified shorthand reporter.
Furthermore>,

dt the hearing re>quested by Appellants to

settle the record regarding jury instructions held on November
JS,

more than five months after the trial, Judge Call

l "83,

etated that he did recall
,]lowing a
I S,

I '' 8 3,

jury trial

Plaintiffs' objecting to the court's

(Trdnscript of Court Proceedings,

November

p. 2 4 , 1. 8- 1 3 ) but a 1 so s ta t e d th a t he had no spec i f i c

recollection regarding
'-hH he hiHJ preclu<l·~·d

jury instructions

(ibid p.

25,

1.1-6) or

enyone from excepting to instructions (ibid

p.

25,

1.6-10).

If

the

tri.,l

court

car1r1ot

regarding proposed Jury instructions,

m,1ke

~i.

(1t_'lt'rn11r1,1t l()n

certdinly this Co11rl

c<1rrnul

do so.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellants have failed to show any substantial .1nd
prejudicial error in the trial proceedings or that

the outcome of

the trial would have been any different if there were errors at
tr i a 1.
The essence of Plaintiffs' appeal
facts,

not the law.

is a challenge of

The parties at trial

the

mutually s•ipulated to

waive all other claims and to proceed to trial on the sole
factual

issue of the location of the lot corner.

Appellants now contend that the Bott Survey and other
evidence and testimony presented by Respondents at
illegal,
evidence.

and thus,

the Jury's verdict

Appellants however,

is not supported by lawful

failed to timely object to the

evidence and testimony as being illegal.
introduced some of the evidence

trial was

In fact,

Appellants

relied on by Respondents.

Since all of the documents and testimony were received
into evidence by the trial court without objection from
Appellants, it was then up to the jury to determine the weight and
credibility they wished to give the evidence and enter a

verdict.

There can no longer be anyquest1on as to the

the

legality of

evidence and this court cannot second 3uess the
attempting to determine how
Court must assume that the

jury in

the jury perceiveu the evicl.,nce.
jury believed those aspects

<)f

th<·

The

wh1ch

(','1d»n_·e

sustn1n

A re\lew uf
[f::'I

the record
in

itols uf

verdict.

the

transcript readily reveals that the

Appellants' brief are remarkably opinionated.

;,,ppel !a11ts sub1ectiv<e conclusions of
princ1pril

issue of

this case,

i.e.,

cl1 £ f

Prently by J1 fferent people.

the

Court, however,

,J(

ficct

what

is

it

It

the same facts can be viewed
Once evidence is received by

Jury) and not the parties to determine

to believed and ;,ccepted,

supported the

merely reinforce the

then becomes the sole province of the trier

(in this case the

Jn this action,

fact

the

and what is not.

Jury chose to believe the evidence which

Respondents' posit1or,,

and so entered their vedict.

is respectfully submitted that the verJict is supported by

substantial eviJence;

that no substantial and prejudicial errors

1·1ere committed at trial;

and that any c,::ror which may have been

rommitted was inconsequential and would not have changed the
verdict had there been no error.
Respondents

respectfully request that

sustained and that

DATED this

the

jury's verdict be

this appeal be dismissed as having no merit.

day rif ;•\arch,

1984.
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